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PREFACE
Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are
to utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The reporter's transcript is designated as "T.

"

With the exception of one day's testimony the entire record was
taken by the same reporter, Mr. Walton; the exception being the
27th day of August, 1976.

Mr. Walton numbered the pages of his

transcript consecutively from 1 to 3443.

The testimony taken on

the 27th day of August fits chronologically between pages 935 and
936 of Mr. Walton's transcript.

The reporter for August 27th num-

bered her transcript from 1 to 121.

In order to avoid confusion

relating to two pages numbered l, 2, 3, etc., the clerk has numbered that transcript with the preface "935."

Thus, citations to

that portion of the transcript are cited as "T. 935-l, T. 935-2,"
etc.
In addition, a transcript dealing with the pretrial conference has been filed to supplement the trial record.

Citations to that transcript

numbered consecutively from l to 82.
are designated as "Supp. T.

This is

"
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. KEITH LIGNELL, !1ARIAN H.
LIGNELL, his wife, BUR'I'ON M.
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*

*
*

*

v.

*

CLIFFORD M. BERG and
WILLIAM R. BERG, a partnership, d/b/a BERG BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY
OF MARYLAND, a corporation,

*

Defendants and
Respondents.

*

*

Case No. 15001

*
*

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
This Reply Brief is directed to the Brief filed herein
by

the defendants-respondents (hereinafter called Defendants'

Brief) and will address the points raised therein, although
not in the same sequence as in Defendants' Brief, the more
pivotal issues being addressed first.
Defendants' Brief employs the same shot-gun "accusatory"
approach employed at trial.

It appears designed to gloss over

the fundamental fact that judgment was rendered in favor of a
legal entity other than that with which plaintiffs-owners
contracted (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 37-45).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Point I.
"LACK OF LICENSE" IS NOT A.."J AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.
Defendants claim that simply because the term "license"

is found in Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., plaintiffs were required to
plead affirmatively that defendants did not have the necessary
contractor's license or else that defense was waived.

A carefu:

review of the applicable statutes and cases indicates that this
contention is erroneous.
A.

License is an "affirmative" defense to a trespass

action that must be specially pleaded.
The defense of license relates primarily to trespass
actions, not actions on a construction contract.

It has been

stated that "consent or a valid license from the owner of land

is a good defense to an action in trespass for acts within the
scope of the license. " 87 c. J. S., Trespass, §49 (emphasis addedl
Numerous cases have recognized "license" as a defense to a
trespass action.

See, e.g., Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co.

v. Union Compress and Warehouse Co., 14 3 F. Supp. 128 (W .D. La
1950); Barbizon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 231 Wis. 426, 286 N.W.
21 (1939); Sheftol v. Zipperer, 133 Ga. 488, 66 S.E. 253 (19091:
Bennett v. Mcintire, 23 N.E. 78
tiffs' Brief, pp. 73-74.

(Ind. 1889); see also Plain-

In order for one to avail himself of

the defense of license in a trespass action, however, that de·
fense must be specially pleaded.

Hamil ton v. Windol f,

(1872); Gronour v. Daniels, 7 Blackford 108

36 Md. ;

(Ind. 1844); ~

Painter, 7 carrington and Pains, English Nisi Prius Reports
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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761

(1837)

(also found in English Reports Full Reprint, Vol. 1 73 ,

334); ~illman v. Dolwell, 2 Campbell Nisi Prius Reports 378
(1810)

(also found in English Reports Full Reprint, Vol. 170,

1190); 1 J. Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading and Parties to
Action (lOth ed. 1847); 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, §71.

In

enunciating this principle the court in Millman v. Dolwell
stated,
"The defendant allows that he intermeddled with
goods which were the property and in the possession
of the plaintiff. By so doing he is presumed to
be a trespasser; and if he has any matter of jusification, he must put it upon the record. The
plea of not guilty only denies the act done, and
the plaintiff's title to the subject of the trespass. If the defendant has any authority, general
or particular, express or implied, from the plaintiff, it must be specially pleaded by way of excuse."
In Gronour v. Daniels it was stated by the court that:
"Here, the tendency of the evidence is not to show
that the defendant has not cut down and carried
away the plaintiff's trees, but to show that he
was justified, by a license from the plaintiff, in
committing the alleged trespass. Such a defense,
it is well settled, must be speci'fically pleaded."
Further, in Hamilton v. Windolf, the court there said:
"If a license had been specially pleaded, as must
be done in actions of trespass when the defendant
seeks to justify by the authority of the plaintiff,
or those under whom he claims, • • • the evidence
offered would have been clearly admissible in bar
of the right to recover • • • but license from the
plaintiff not having been specially pleaded, the
evidence was inadmissible to defeat the action
under the general issue simply."
Chitty has stated, "An excuse of the trespass, as on
account of • • • a license from the plaintiff • • • must be
Pleaded specially."

1 J. Chitty, supra at 505.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Rules of Practice in existence prior t

o the time th:

the present Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted provided that
an answer must contain " ( 2) a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim."
(1943).

--

Section 104-9-1, U.C.A,

Failure to raise a defense resulted in its waiver.

Section 104-B-6, U.C.A.

(1943).

Thus we see that a plea of

license, i.e., permission, being a statement of new matter
constituting a defense, had to be pled affirmatively even under
what defendants characterize as "the old pleading practice" or
it was waived.

It is iDteresting to note, however, that even

under the "old pleading practice" the courts of this state dete:
mined long ago that when a contractor was attempting to recover
upon a contract--as opposed to an action in trespass--the burdeof pleading and proving the existence of a valid license was
upon the contractor and that there was no waiver if "lack of
license" was not raised as a defense to that action.
Elwell, 116 Utah 521, 211 P.2d 849
Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733

Eklund v.

(1949); Olsen v. Reese, 114

(1948); Smith v. American Packing

Provision co., 102 Utah 357, 130 P.2d 951

(1942).

&

Thus, one

must conclude that the "license" that is a prerequisite to a
recovery by a contractor must be pleaded as part of the con·
tractor's affirmative case, not as a defense thereto.

B.

The Rules of Civil Procedure did not shift the b~

of pleading "lack of license" to plaintiffs.
Apparently defendants would have this Court believe that
the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950 by some
magical
of Funding
hand
transferred
to the
owners
the
Sponsored
by the S.J.sleight
Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bur den o''

pleading "lack of license" relating to the defendant contractor.
Plaintiffs submit that this contention is in error.

The enumera-

tion of the affirmative defenses in Rule B(c) and particularly
the word "license" is merely a codification of the practice that
has existed for over one hundred years.

In other words, Rule

S(c) codifies the requirement that in an action for trespass "an
excuse of trespass as on account of a license from the plaintiff
must be pleaded specially."

l J. Chitty, supra.

Had the drafters

of the Rules of Civil Procedure intended to impact the contractor's
license issue, they would have listed "lack of license" as the
affirmative defense.
C.

Defendants must still .state a cause of action in their

counterclaim.
While it is true that the Rules of Civil Procedure removed some of the technical formalities of pleadings, they do
not relieve a party from the requirement of stating a cause of
action.

As has been stated:
"While modern procedural statutes and rules of
practice relieve the plaintiff of much of the formality in the statement of his claim required under
common law practice, the requirements are still substantially the same as under the common law respecting a statement of his cause of action. " 61 Am. Jur.
2d, Pleading, §73.

While defendants quoted extensively from Professor Moore (Defendants' Brief, pp. 64-66), they neglected to cite the Court
to one key paragraph.

After making the statements relied upon

by defendants, Professor Moore goes on to say:

"
the pleadings still must state a 'cause of
action' in the sense that it must show 'that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-s-

ple~de~ is entitled to relief.'
It is not enough
to ~nd~cate ID7r~ly that the plaintiff has a grievance but suff~c~ent detail must be given so that
the defendant and the court can obtain a fair id
of what the plaintiff is complaining and can seeea
that there is some legal basis for recovery."
2A J. Moore, Federal Practice, §8.13, p. 1705
(1975 ed).

Justice Lester Wade, the leading jurist involved in the
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated:
"A party should not plead the evidence and is not
required, as under the code, to detail the ultimate
facts.
Allegations may take the form of what under
the code would be called conclusions of law, for
m:::>st of the statements contained in the forms would
have been so classified.
The new rules do require
a short, plain statement, with sufficient detail
so that the adversary can be reasonably required
to frame a responsive pleading thereto, which
statement must cover the field sufficiently to
show that the pleader is entitled to relief, or,
to use a code term 'state a cause of action'.
Although the new rules do not require as much
detail as the code, they do require that the pleadings cover the s~e necessary elements to show
that the pleader is entitled to relief as is necessary under the code to state a cause of action.
If one or some of those necessary elements are
omitted, then the pleading is subject to a ITOtion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), for 'failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'
On the hearing on such a m:::>tion, the Court might
admit outside evidence and treat it as a rrotion
for summary judgment under Rule 56, thereby disposing of the case on the merits." L. Wade, Some
of the Purposes and Effects of the New Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, 2 Utah L. Rev. 21 (1950).
(emphasis added).
Thus , while it is true that the demurrer, as such, was
eliminated by Rule 7 (c) , the concept of determining the legal
sufficiency of a complaint has been retained by Rule

12 (b) (G)

which requires a complaint to state a claim upon which re 1'le f
may be granted.

.
th
ode is
What was known as a demurrer under
e c

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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now designated as a !lOtion under the new rules.
P . 12.

L. Wade, supra,

Professor Moore states, "A ..~tion
to d'~sm~ss
·
~ •
under 12(b)

(6) performs substantially the same function as the old common
law general demurrer." 2A J. Moore, supra, §12.08, p. 2265.

It

has been further stated that:
"Motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted have the force
and effect of demurrers • • • • They have been viewed
as a substitute for, as supplanting, as serving the
function of, as equivalent of, or as largely partaking of the nature of demurrers; and raising the
same legal issues as formerly raised by demurrers;
i.e. , the legal sufficiency of the complaint. "
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, Vol. 5, §15.150,
p. 109 (3d ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
Justice Wade recognized that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure require the pleader to cover in his prima facie case
the same elements to show that he is entitled to relief as was
necessary under the Code to state a cause of action.

Prior to

1950 the cases are clear that in Utah it was necessary for a
contractor to allege and prove as a part of his affirmative case
that he was licensed in the State of Utah as required by §5823-1, et seq.

Plaintiffs submit that the authorities uniformly

hold that the pre-1950 requirements have not been changed by
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and proof of
licensing is still a necessary element of a contractor's case.
To contend, as defendants do, that it is no longer necessary
for a party to state a cause of action under the present Rules
of Civil Procedure is sheer nonsense, particularly in view of
Rule 12{b) (6), which, as Justice Wade has pointed out, is the
vehicle by which the sufficiency of the pleadings are tested
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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and which clearly requires that a part

t t
Y s a e a cause of actio:.

in order to remain in court.
D.

An affirmative defense raises matters outside ~e

prima facie case.
Defendants base their argument that the burden of plead·
ing "lack of license" has shifted to the plaintiffs upon ~e
dicta found in one case, Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 502
(Utah 1976); careful analysis indicates clearly that their
reliance upon that case is ill-founded.

In General Ins. Co.

America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502

0:

(Utah 1976),

this Court stated:
"A defense that merely controverts plaintiff's
prima facie case is negative in character and
should be pleaded in accordance with Rule 8(b)
and Rule S(c) then becomes inapplicable, for an
affirmative defense raises matter outside the
scope of pla~nt~ff's prima facie case." (emphasis
added).
As authority for this proposition, the Court cited to
Federal Practice.

~

Professor Moore states in his treatise:

"Matter which merely controverts plaintiff's
prima facie case is a negative defense.
"A true affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case
and such matter is not raised by a negative defense." 2A J. Moore, supra, §8.27(4).
Professor Moore goes on to remark that the above stated princip.

is equally applicable to a defendant's counterclaim.

g,

at

Footnote No. 1.. Thus, Rule 8 (c) only comes into play when mat·
ters outside the scope of a party's prima facie case are to be
raised as a defense.
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Once the principle that an affirmative defense deals with
matters outside of the plaintiff's prima facie case is brought
into focus the dicta of the Court in the Whyte case is easily
understood.

The Whyte case was not an action by a contractor

suing upon a construction contract; rather, it was an action by
an employee-plaintiff suing an employer for back wages.

under

the facts of that case the employee's prima facie case was
adequately stated when he alleged the existence of the employer/employee relationship, the work done and the amount owing.
Thus, under those circumstances, the claim by the defendant that
plaintiff was not an employee but, rather, was an independent
contractor, and an unlicensed independent contractor at that,
would be a defense that "raises matter outside the scope of
plaintiff's prima facie case," Gen. Ins. Co. of America v.
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra, and thus would have to be
pleaded as an affirmative defense.

But, that fact situation

is vastly different from the instant case.

In the instant

case one of the parties to a joint venture, which joint venture
was the contractor, was seeking by way of counterclaim to
recover upon a construction contract.

Leaving aside for a

moment the question of the propriety of this procedure (see
Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 37-45), we have a situation where the entity
(partnership) seeking to recover did not Elead that it was properly licensed at the time in question (T. 1387).

Thus, defendants

failed in their pleading to even state a prima facie case and,
in the words of this court, Rule 8(c} became inapplicable since,
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......,

"an affirmative defense raises matter outs;de th
...
e scope of th;
plaintiff's prima facie case." G
I
c
f
en. ns. o. o America v.
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra.l

E.

Proof of a valid contractor's license is part of

defendants' prima facie case.
The issue presented to this Court then is whether a COn·
tractor's prima facie case may now be made out without pleadin:
or proof of a valid existing contractor's license. 2

There can

be no question that prior to the enactment of the Rules of Civ:
Procedure a contractor was required to prove as part of his
prima facie case that the valid contractor's license existed.
Eklund v. Elwell, supra; Olsen v. Reese, supra; Smith v. Amerit
Packing Co., supra.
treatises

Defendants cite no applicable cases and nc

to support their contention that in spite of the cle

mandate of the legislature, §78-2-4, U.C.A., and in spite oftt
views of Justice Wade, that this substantive requirement has nc·
been shifted over to the owners.

Plaintiffs submit that them:

recent cases of this Court clearly show that proof of a

valid~

tractor's license is indeed still a part of the prima facie ca!'
that a contractor must prove in order to recover on a construct
contract (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 69).

This position was affirme:

lThis Court also held "lack of" consideration was not U:
same as failure of consideration under Rule 8. Plaintiffs sub·
mit that "lack of" license is also not the equivalent of
"1 icense" under that rule •
2rf, indeed, one may say that a legal principle re-enun·
ciated by this Court as recently as 15 months ago can still be
an issue in the trial courts of this state.
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by

this Court as recently as July of 1977 when it specifically

reaffirmed its prior holding in the case of Olsen v. Reese.
see Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah
1977).

Nor does Utah stand alone in this matter.

As previously

cited to this Court (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 76-78), the Supreme
Court of Georgia dealt with this precise issue and held that
under their equivalent of our Rules of Civil Procedure it was
incumbent upon the person claiming compensation in an occupation for which a license was required to prove the existence of
that license.

Plaintiffs submit that such is still the state of

the law in Utah; the burden of pleading a license was upon the
defendant since license was a portion of defendant's prima facie
case; plaintiff had no obligation to raise "lack of license" as
an affirmative defense; further, the term "license" as used in
Rule 8(c) refers to the plea of justification or excuse for an
action of trespass and has no application to this case.

The

issue is properly raised by a general denial and a defense that
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
F.

Plaintiffs so pled (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 79-80). 3
The case of Olsen v. Reese still accurately sets forth

the law of this state.
An observation on the case of Olsen v. Reese is required
because of comments contained in Defendants' Brief.

Defendants

3In the case of Sumner Development Corp. v. Shivers, 517
P.2d 757 (Alaska 1974) an unlicensed contractor was p7eclu~ed
from recovering on the construction contract due to h~s fa~lure
to obtain the necessary license. Defendants ~id no~ plead "lack
of license" but, rather, pled that the compla~nt fa~led to state
a claim. When the lack of license became known, defendants then
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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argue that since the demurrer was abolished that case has also
met its demise.

A careful reading of that case, ho wever, indic:

that the results would be the same if that rna tt er arose today
under our present rules.

--

The defendant there filed a general

demurrer to plaintiff's complaint which was overruled.

Thereat:

defendant filed an answer but did not raise the issue of lack o!
a contractor's license.

Judgment was entered for the contracto:

in the city court and the defendant appealed.

During cross-

examination of the contractor in the district court, evidence
was adduced for the first time that the plaintiff was not propa
licensed.

Upon motion of the defendant the action was dismisse,'

because the plaintiff had not alleged and had not established
that he was a licensed contractor.

It was obvious to the trial

judge that the plaintiff in fact did not have a license.

The

motion of defendant was called a demurrer by the trial court.
Respondents' characterization of the action being dismissed on i
general demurrer, however 1 is inaccurate.

Further 1 the action

was dismissed in spite of defendants' failure to plead "lack of
license" and in spite of §§104-9-1 and 104-8-6 u.c.A. (1943)
dealing with "affirmative defenses" and waiver.

The dismissal

was upheld by this Court.
There are at least two key similarities between ~e
instant case and Olsen v. Reese:

(1)

In both cases the issue

of the contractor's license was not pled by any party 1 and (ll
·
d came to light
the fact that the contractor was not 1 ~cense

during the course o f th e

· 1.

tr~a

Pla;nt;ffs
submit that the
•
•
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results of both cases should also be the same, the contractor's
claim in the instant action should have been dismissed when
plaintiffs so moved.
G.

Defendants' cases relating to plaintiffs' failure

to plead are inapplicable to the facts of this case.
After calling the 1948 case of Olsen v. Reese "old, 11
defendants cite to two cases decided in 1917 and 1928, respectively, in support of their argument on waiver (Defendants'
Brief, p. 63).
here.

The facts of those cases are totally inapposite

One case dealt with a separate suit ·to set aside a judg-

ment after it had been entered.

The other case concerned a

motion to set aside a default judgment filed some 23 months
after judgment had been entered.

Plaintiffs have no quarrel

with a waiver being imposed under the facts of those cases,
but they have no application to the instant case.
Defendants seek relief from their failure to license
based upon the case of Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977).

Several distinctions

between that case and this, however, are readily apparent.

There

a general contractor was attempting to avoid payment to a "subcontractor. 11

The court held that the general contractor had a

special duty to deal only with licensed contractors and thus could
not avoid payment solely because it had dealt with an unlicensed
subcontractor.

There also the entire project was under the su-

pervision of a licensed project engineer.

Further, the subcon-

tractor had not held itself out to the public as being licensed.
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None of these criteria fit the instant case.
contracting owners were members of the general public

Here the

'
class the statute was designed to protect; further, the

th

e very

contrac·

tor held itself out to the public as being a contractor under
the laws of the state of Utah.

The general contractor was also

primarily on its own regarding supervision of the project.
Defendants attempt to fit within the narrow holding of Fillmore,
therefore, must be rejected.
Defendants also claim plaintiffs should have pleaded
"illegality," but the case of Rathke cited by them provides
defendants with little support.

There the issue of illegality

was not pled by defendant but was raised for the first time on
a IOOtion for summary judgment at the conclusion of plaintiff's
case.

The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice and

the supreme court affirmed noting that it was not necessary to
plead illegality and that that matter can be raised at any time.
Further, the court said where illegality appears at any stage
of the proceedings it becomes the duty of the court to refuse
to entertain the action.
8

Plaintiffs submit, however, that the

illegality" contemplated in Rule 8 (c) differs from the conduct

defendant here.

See Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C.

264, 162 S.E.2d 50 7 (1968) •

That such contracts may be enforcei

by the party which is not an unlicensed contractor is rore full!
set forth in pp. 15-20 of this Brief.
The other "illegality" cases cited by defendants have no
· so!l
relevance here. ~ dealt with the illegality of a prornlS
In
note
which issue was raised for the first time on appeal.
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seaboard Surety defendants pled illegality but that defense
was stricken by the trial court.

Intercontinental Promotions

dealt with the 1974 heavyweight title fight between Muhammad
Ali and Sonny Liston.

Though totally irrelevant to the issues

presented in this appeal, it does contain a fascinating history
of boxing. 4
H.

Plaintiffs could maintain an action on the contract

without waiving the defense of defendants' failure to license.
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision (R. Cl3951397), was apparently of the opinion that Lignell and Todd had

waived the defense of lack of license by bringing suit on the contract.

Defendants argue that by suing on the contract, plain-

tiffs affirmed it as valid and enforceable (Defendants' Brief,
p. 20).

The court's ruling and the statement by defendants

raises two questions:

(1) may members of the public sue to

enforce a contract with an unlicensed contractor; and (2)
if a member of the public does so, what is the effect upon an
unlicensed contractor's ability to use the contract as the
basis for a defense or counterclaim.

A good collection of cases

on the subject is found at 82 A.L.R. 2d 1429 to 1468, §§3(b) and
6 (b).

1.

An unlicensed contractor may be sued on the

construction contract.
Section 58-23-1, as amended, was enacted for the protection
4For instance, we learn that the first time gloves were
used in a heavyweight title fight was in 18 92 in the bout
between Gentleman Jim Corbett and John L. Sullivan.
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of the public.

Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker co., supra:

Olsen v. Reese, supra.

In such cases, 17 Am. Jur. 2d, ContracL

§228, states the rule as follows:
"The rul~ gove7ning. cases in which the parties
are not ~n par~ del~cto is frequently applied
where the transaction is in violation of a law
made for the protection of one party against the
acts of the others; as they are not equally guilty,
the party protected may recover. Where a class
of contracts is prohibited for the protection of
particular parties thereto, the adverse parties
cannot take advantage of the illegalities of such
contracts.
Moreover, if the refusal to enforce
such a contract would produce a harmful effect
on the party for whose protection the law making
the bargain illegal exists, it will be enforced."
The Restatement of Contracts in §§599 and 601, reports a sirnila:
rule:
"Where the illegality of a bargain is due to (a)
facts of which one party is justifiably ignorant
and the other party is not, or (b) statutory or
executive regulations of a minor character relating to a particular business which are unknown w
one party, who is justified in assuming special
knowledge by the other party of the requirements
of the law, the illegality does not preclude recovery by the ignorant party of compensation for
any performance rendered while he is still justifiably ignorant, or for losses incurred or gains
prevented by non-performance of the bargain.
"If refusal to enforce or rescind an illegal bargain would produce a harmful effect on parties
for whose protection the law making the bargain
illegal exists, enforcement or rescission, whichever is appropriate, is allowed. "
An excellent opinion holding that an innocent party c~
maintain an action for breach of contract, even though the con·
tractor had not obtained the required license, is found in
Cohen v. Mayflower Corporation, 86 S.E. 2d 860, 196 Va. llSJ
(1955).

In that case, Mayflower Corporation sought judgment
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against an unlicensed contractor, Cohen, and his surety to
recover damages for breach of two written contracts.

The de-

fendants argued that since a license had not been obtained,
the contracts were illegal and void, and that consequently an
action for damages for breach of the contracts and recovery under
the performance bond could not be maintained.

The court decided

the issue against the contractor in a richly annotated opinion,
citing Corbin, Williston, Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
Am

Jur., and California, Montana, Indiana, and New Jersey cases.

Citing Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 6, Section 1510, p. 962, the
court writes:
"There can be no doubt that a bargain made by an
unlicensed guilty dealer, broker or lawyer, with
another person who is innocent of offense, is not
totally void. It would be a rare or non-existent
case in which such an innocent person could not
maintain some kind of action for breach of the
agreement by the guilty party who is wrongfully
engaged in business . • • • This view is based upon
the principle that such innocent parties are
among the class of persons designed to be protected by such statutes, that he is not in pari
delicto with the unlicensed party, and is therefore entitled to relief. Or, to state the matter another way, to deny relief to the innocent
party in such cases, would defeat the purpose
of the statute and penalize the person intended
to be protected thereby. "
A similar rule is recognized in other jurisdictions,
see, e.g., Bathroom Design Institute v. Parker, 317 A.2d 526
(D.c. App. 1974); Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, supra;

Dias v. Houston, 315 P.2d 885, 154 Cal. App. 279 (1957); Allen
v. Miller, 150 NYS 2d 285 (1955).
Plaintiffs submit that the licensing statutes of the
by the S.J.do
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swering for overpayments and faulty work as defendants suggest

(Defendants' Brief, p. 69) .

The preceding cases so indicate;

indeed, a contrary rule would subvert the protective .n
; t ent of
the Legislature and allow an unlicensed contractor to gain an
advantage solely from his failure to comply with the law.
2.

Even if sued on a construction contract an un-

licensed contractor may not avoid the consequences of his
failure to be properly licensed.
When a member of the protected class seeks to recover
damages or overpayments from an unlicensed con tractor, should
this "open the flood gates" and allow an unlicensed contractor
to recover unpaid amounts on the construction contract?
This Court has apparently not dealt with this question
directly but its views can be determined from at least two case!
Mosley v. Johnson and Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States
Paving, both of which involved contract claims against an unli·
censed contractor while at the same time relying upon the defem
of lack of license to the claim by the unlicensed contractor.
Mosley v. Johnson, supra, an unlicensed well-digger sought compensa tion for work done.

The defendants claimed that Mosley

wa:

precluded from recovering because he was unlicensed and fileiJ
counterclaim for the return of a drill bit given to Mosley in
partial payment of his claim.S

In spite of that counterclaim,

this Court held that the well-digger could not recover thereto!:
unpaid amounts under the contract because he was not properlY

h con·
SMosley concerned itself with payments due under t e
tract and did not deal with overpayments at all as defendants
erroneously state.
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licensed.

In Fillmore Products v. Western states Paving, Inc.,

supra, this Court was confronted with a suit by an unlicensed
subcontractor against its general contractor and a substantial
counterclaim by the general contractor against the subcontractor
alleging breach of the contract.

The court permitted suit by

the unlicensed subcontractor but did so upon the ground that the
general contractor was not a member of the class protected by
the licensing statute.

It is significant that the Court did not

say that a suit upon the construction

cont~act

(here in the form

of a counterclaim) constituted a waiver of the defense of lack of
license as defendants· suggest.

In fact, in neither case was the

counterclaim, or suit upon the contract, considered material to
the decision.

Two cases employing an·approach similar to this

Court's where failure to license was argued at the same time a
counterclaim was filed are Food Management, Inc. v. Blue Ribbon
Beef Pack., Inc., 413 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1969) and Scott-Daniels
Properties, Inc. v. Dresser, 281 Minn. 179, 160 N.W.2d 675
(1968) •

The rule tacitly recognized by this court in Mosley and
Fillmore Products has also been recognized in other jurisdictions.

Plaintiffs submit that it is a correct statement of the

law that while an unlicensed contractor is barred from recovering
in an action brought by him, if the action is brought by the
other contracting party the unlicensed contractor may, as a
defense only, offset against the plaintiff's claim such sums
as may be due und~r the contract.

The unlicensed contractor,
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however, may only offset amounts due
he may not obtain affirmative rel1.'ef
struction contract.

d
un er the contract,
even if sued upon the con·

See Lindhou t v. Ingersoll, 58 Mich. App,

446, 228 N.W.2d 415
517 P.2d 757

(1975); Sumner Development
_
(Alaska 1974); Dahl-Beck Electric

80 Cal. Rptr. 440
supra.

corp •

v • Shivero

Company v.

--=--.:r
~~

(1969); Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette,

A suit on a construction contract, therefore, does not

waive the defense of lack of 11.· cense.

As a resu 1 t, plaintiffs

were free to sue upon the construction contract and still main·
tain their right to raise defendants'

lack of license when that

fact became known.6
Allowing one party to bring suit to recover for damages
or overpayment on a contra-ct while denying the unlicensed contra
tor the opportunity to sue on that same contract is both equital.
and cognizant of the regulatory intent of the Legislature.
has at least two beneficial results:

(1)

It

It permits a party tc

recover from the contractor overpayments and damages for defec·
tive work, but precludes the unlicensed contractor from benefit·
ing from his violation of the law, and (2)

denies the unlicensa

contractor the ability to recover unpaid amounts under his con·
tract, thus leaving the teeth in our licensing statute.
• 0

6The surety here provided a Performance Bond guaranteeln.
that the project would be built for a certain price. In February, 1974, some $115,576.10 in funds were advanced by ~e d
owners to close the project. These funds were advanced, base
upon an agreement with the surety that by so doing the owners
would not prejudice any rights that they might have to recover
any overpayment on the contract from the bonding company (Exs.
14 5, 146) • Thus, plaintiffs could clearly :r::equire the suret~e
to pay back any overpayment under the terms of the Per~or~~
Bond and under the conditions of the agreement upon wh1.ch e
Sponsored byfunds
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I.

Plaintiffs diligently sought to ascertain if defen-

dants were licensed.
Lignell, Todd and their attorneys were unaware after
reasonable efforts that Berg Brothers Construction company (the
partnership) was unlicensed until after trial had commenced.
Immediately upon discovery of that fact, they informed all parties and the court.

Further, as earlier discussed, prior decisions

of this Court have plainly indicated that lack of license was an
element of the contractor's case, not a defense to be asserted
by the owners.

Under such circumstances, even knowing silence

should not be construed as a waiver of defense.
1.

Plaintiffs first discovered defendants were not

licensed on September 1, 1976.
Respondents' wild speculation which,attempts to impute
to plaintiffs some sinister motive for the timing of their Motion
to Dismiss requires some comment.

Defendants base much of their

argument upon the statement by plaintiffs that the joint venture
did not have a valid contractor's license and that this fact
was known to all parties early in the litigation.
ants' Brief, p. 68.

See Defend-

Defendants are either attempting to de-

liberately mislead this Court or else,

at

this late stage of the

litigation, are still unwilling, or incapable, of distinguishing
between the joint venture (Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg,
a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company, and
Frank c. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg
Construction company) and the partnership (Clifford M. Berg and
William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction
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Company).

The partnership, not the joint venture, was th e

which filed the counterclaim in this matter.
Brief, pp. 37-45.

ent~·

See Plaintiffs'

The joint venture, not the partnership, was

the entity which made the construct;on
•
con t ract and furnished
the bonds.

It is true that all parties, includ;ng
d e f en dants,
•

recognized at the inception of the litigation that th e JOlnt
· ·
venture was not properly licensed.
so stipulated

(T.

3048).

Counsel for defendants

This, in plaintiffs' view, is ~e

reason that the joint venture--the entity that was the contract·
ing party--did not file anv kind of a pleading in this action
other than a denial to plaintiffs' complaint.

On the other hac

the unlicensed partnership--the non-contracting entity--filed a
counterclaim based upon the construction contract upon which
recovery was ultimately had.

Plaintiffs' point that the part·

nership had no standing to counterclaim, since it was not the
contracting party, is not even discussed in Defendants'

Brief,

let alone answered.

That point alone would require reversal oi

the judgment below.

The point under discussion is that even if

arguendo, the partnership had been the contracting party, it
still could not have recovered, since it neither pleaded nor
proved that it was licensed to contract.
In their haste to arrive at "inescapable" conclusions
after indulging in speculative fantasies concerning the
rotives of counsel for plaintiffs, defendants have failed
consult the record in this matter.

When it first came

to

w

plaintiffs' attention that the partnership was not properlY
the trial court.
licensed, that matter Was brought before
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At

that time

Mr. Nebeker, counsel for the bonding company, sug-

gested the same thesis that he is proposing in the Brief, to-wit,
that the information of lack of license had been known previously by plaintiffs' counsel.

In direct response to this allegation,

J. Thomas Bowen, one of plaintiffs' attorneys,

stated, "Mr.

Nebeker, I' 11 tell you in the record we had no knowledge of the
failure to license for those years until the very night we called
you

(T. 1411 l , which was the night before the notion to dismiss

the counterclaim was made to the court.

The theory again being

espoused by counsel for defendants wholly lacks any documentation
or support in the record and, indeed, is in direct contradiction
to the record and the affidavits on file in this matter.
2.

Clifford Berg is chargeable with knowledge that

the partnership was not licensed.
It is curious that defendants will go to such great
lengths to cast aspersions on the counsel for plaintiffs.

One

can only assume that they are attempting to obscure their own
actions with relation to the licensing issue.

One fact is

beyond dispute, Clifford Berg knew in July, 1974, that neither
he nor his partnership was licensed by the Department of Contractors and that they had net been licensed since April 30,
1971

(Ex. 242-D).

How, or whether, Clifford Berg was able to

keep this important information from his counsel we cannot say,
but his pleadings are totally devoid of any claim by him that he
or his partnership was properly licensed, a claim that one would
normally expect to find in a suit by a contractor·

Defendants
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•

argue that the "equities" in this case should require
•
the Court
to find against plaintiffs because of their "deliberate omissio
to plead."

(Defendants' Brief, p. 72).

Plaintiffs submit,

however, that this contention has no merit.

The deliberate

omission to plead was, if anyone's, the omission of Berg.
Plaintiffs made several telephone calls to the Department of
Contractors to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of a
contractor's license on behalf of Mr. Berg's partnership (R,
C992-996) and were erroneously advised that the partnership was
validly licensed.

In addition, they made numerous attempts to

review the records of the Department of Contractors which were
mysteriously not available.

Thus, defendants'argurnent that

items in the record were there to be seen does not address the
problem that existed, that is, that due to circumstances beyona
plaintiffs' control the record could not be located even by
diligent effort.

Only Berg knew, when the trial started, that

the partnership lacked a contractor's license.

The onus, if

any, must be on him.
3.

The burden of ascertaining and pleading the exis·

tence of the license was defendants'.
The facts of this case demonstrate the wisdom of this
court long ago recognizing that a party claiming a right

w

recover under a contract for which a license is required is
uniquely better able to ascertain the existence of that license.
. .
Smith v. American Packing & Provl.sl.on
Co., supra.

In the instM

although Berg and hl.. s partnership were chargeable with knowled~i
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that defendants' counsel believed that the partnership was
properly licensed and thus made the conscious election to counterclaim on behalf of the partnership rather than the unlicensed
joint venture, thus hoping to finesse the issue of the joint
venture's lack of license, or lose the issue in the morass of
complexity created by defendants joining the several suits
together. 7
J.

Defendants' conclusions concerning plaintiffs' failure

to plead "lack of license" are erroneous.
Defendants argue that since lack of licensing had been
raised by plaintiffs in the other suits that were ultimately
joined that same issue should have been raised against the contractor.

In so arguing, defendants ignore the fact that

plaintiffs' review of the files of the Department of Business
Regulation with relation to the drywall subcontractors occurred
in December, 1974, while defendants' counterclaim was not filed
until January, 1975.

Both Murray Electric and Comstock Elec-

ttic pled as a part of their prima facie case the existence of
a valid contractor's license.

Thus, the existence or nonexistence

of those licenses was clearly an issue in that case.

No such

claim was made by the defendant joint venture and the counterclaiming partnership did not plead as part of its affirmative
case the existence of a valid contractor's license.

Under the

case law this was a fatal defect and plaintiffs properly raised
7when the facts of lack of a valid license came to light
on the second day of the trial between the owners and the joint
venture, counsel for the Bergs contacted his clients and "was
assured
by them that the licenses were intact." (T. 1385) •
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the issue by pleading that counterclaimants failed to statea
claim on which relief could be gran ted.

Pl ·

·f

a~nt~

fs should have

been permitted to adduce their proof under t h at iss ue , but were
erroneously denied their right to do so.

state is sound public policy.
One further element in this matter of license deserves
comment.

Tne dissent in Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker

Co., supra, appears to argue that a contract should not be void
for lack of the proper license in this state because such a
sanction is not expressly provided for in the statute and that
if the Legislature had intended for this to be the result it
should have so stated.

This position, however, ignores

~e

traditional role of this Court as the interpreter of a statute
and the interplay between the legislative and judicial branches
of government.

The fact that the Legislature has

~

acted

throughout the !!Ore than 30 years during which this Court un·
equivocally interpreted the statute to mean that an unlicensed
contractor cannot recover upon his construction contract must~
taken as an indication that the Legislature concurs with that
interpretation of the statute.

It is only when the Legislature

does not concur with a statutory interpretation that legislativ<
action has any point.

To require the Legislature to pass legis·

lation ratifying or agreeing with all the interpretations of
statutes by this Court would serve no useful purpose.
The rule that an unlicensed contractor cannot recover

00

his contract is based on sound public policy and should clearlY
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be continued within this state.8

Th

e

f

act that the statute does

not expressly provide for this remedy, but that it has come
about by judicial interpretation, should not affect the validity
of that proposition.
A similar judicial prohibition against an unlicensed
party maintaining an action is recognized in many other jurisdictions.

Farmer v. Farmer, 520

s.w.

2d 539 (Tenn. 1975) (con-

tractor); Jary v. Emmett, 234 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1970)
(architect); Rodgers v. Kelley, 128 Vt. 146, 259 A.2d 784 (1969)
(architect); George H. Weinrott & Co. v. Burlington House Corp.,
22 N.J. Supr. 91, 91 A.2d 660 (1952) (engineer); Johnson v. Dahlgreen,
59 N.W. 987

(N.Y.

1901) (plumber).

See also, 15 Am. Jur.

2d, Licenses and Permits, §63; 15 Williston on Contracts, §1766
(3d ed.).

Further, it is sound public policy that the law should
be interpreted and applied so that litigation is kept to a minimum.

If an unlicensed contractor dealing with an owner were

permitted under certain undefined and undefinable circumstances
to enforce his contract, the increase in litigation defining
just when it was permissible would ensnare virtually every case
involving an unlicensed contractor.
opened.

Pandora's box would be

If a balancing test is applied, every contractor will

litigate and appeal hoping that it can tip the scales of justice
in its favor.

The district courts will undoubtedly do the best

8That the public is deeply interested.is d7monstrated by a
recent series on the subject of contractor l~cens~g and the need
for enforcement in one of the leading daily Salt Lake newspapers.
The specter
ofS.J.the
would
contracting
without
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that they can, but it is submitted that every contractor's
license case will be appealed to the Supreme Court for another
review of the balancing proposition.

Pl ·

· ff

a~nt~

s submit that a

continued affirmation that an unlicensed contractor cannot
recover in this state will have many beneficial aspects:

(l)

It will provide certainty in this area of the law thereby forewarning contractors that they must be licensed,

(2)

it will

dininish litigation in this field since the determination that
a contractor is not licensed will preclude his recovery, and
(3)

i t will greatly increase the probability that construction

work in this state is done only by qualified parties.9
The ability of the state to control the construction
industry will

be greatly diminished if a person can ignore the

licensing statutes with impunity or with a modest fine, which
would be the equivalent of impunity.

Indeed, if such were the

case, the refusal of the administrator to issue a license
(§58-23-10) would have no practical effect and the protection
of the public envisioned by the Legislature would be nonexistent
As has been stated:
"Anyone engaged in building trades must be charged with
awareness of the pervasive system of licenses and P7r· ct
mits designed to enhance the public safety and conflden
in the industry.
Engrafting equitable exceptions onto
the enforcement policy at best aids the ignorant and d
gullible, whom the legislature sought to regulate, an
at worst creates fertile fields for the growth o~ sharp
practice." Sumner Development Corporation v. Sh1vers,
supra, p. 763.
· ·
to ob· .~
9section 58-23-10 establishes as a prerequ~s~t~
1
·
t s at 1 s£actor
taining a construction license that the app1 ~can
b Ddin:·
show experience, financial responsibility, knowledge of u
safety and health laws, and provide a bond.
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Point II.
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PARTNERSHIP WAS IN
ERROR.

Defendants admit in their Brief that the action brought
against them by plaintiffs was upon the Performance Bond and
further admit that they were sued upon the Payment Bond by the
two subcontractors

(Defendants'

Brief, pp. 50-51).

After thus

acknowledging the existence of two bonds the defendants attempt
to obscure that fact, apparently in the hope that this Court
will not distinguish between the Labor and Material Payment Bond
and the Performance Bond issued in this matter.

There is no

doubt that they are two separate bonds and that the defendant
surety has

and continues to recognize them as such.

The Findings

of Fact, prepared by surety, recite that there was a Labor and
Material Payment Bond and a Performance Bond (R. Cl412).

Even a

rrost cursory reading of the two bonds clearly shows that there
are differences between the two documents.
A.

The Labor Payment Bond is different than the Performance

The Performance Bond provides that no right of action
shall accrue to anyone other than the owner named therein.

The

subcontractors, therefore, have no right to sue upon that bond

and have not done so.

It further requires that suit based thereon

must be instituted before the expiration of ~ years from the
date on which final payment under the contract falls due.
The Labor and Material Payment Bond, on the other hand,
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bond without notice of their intention to do so.

That bond

further provides that suit based thereon must be brought

~

one year of the date on which the principal ceases to do ~e

work.
B.

Only Material Bonds are required for private con-

tracts in this state.
Defendants contend that §14-2-1 requires the owner to
obtain both a performance bond and a labor and material payment
bond.

Such is not the case!

Section 14-2, et seq., deals with

a "bond to protect mechanics and materialmen".

There is absolut

ly nothing said therein respecting a performance bond.

The

statute relied upon by surety was enacted by our Legislature in
1963.

At that time, the Legislature also enacted the majority

of what is now §14-1, et seq., relating to public contracts.
review of that chapter clearly indicates that the

A

Legislat~e

was well aware of the distinction between a performance bond an:
a labor and material payment bond.
In §14-1-5 the Legislature provided that both a perforl!:
bond [§14-1-5 (1) 1 and a payment bond [§14-1-5 (2) 1 were required
where public contracts were concerned.

The attorney's fee pro·

vision relating to public contracts provides that "in an action
brought upon either of the bonds provided herein" a reasonable
attorney's fee may be recovere d
upon by the defendants

(§14 - 1 - 8) •

The Stat ute relied

( § 14 - 2 - 3) , ho weve r , Pro vides for attorne:

fees only "in any action brought upon the bond."

"The bOnd"

referred to in §14-2-3 is a bond to protect mechanics and mat·
erialmen.
As Law
defendants
well provided
know,
theand Legislature
was
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well aware at the time the subject statute was enacted, a
mechanics and materialmen's bond ("the bond") is not the same
as a performance bond.

Defendants' claim for entitlement to

attorney's fees, therefore, must fail in light of the clear
Legislative intent of the statute and in view of the fact that
there was no suit brought upon a material payment bond in
which plaintiffs were directly involved by the time the attorney's fee issues were before the trial court.10

Even the

disputed Findings of Fact adopted by the Court specifically
recite that the bonds were issued to Berg Construction Company
(the joint venture) not to the partnership, Berg Brothers
Construction Company (R. Cl412); thus, the partnership, not
being a party to the bonds , could not recover thereon.

None-

theless, the trial court erroneously, and confusedly, permitted
such a recovery.
C.

The cases cited by defendants are inapplicable.

Defendants cite several cases and annotations dealing
with the award of attorney's fees based upon the foreclosure
of a mechanic's lien, or in actions relating to a tort or breach
of contract, none of which are applicable to the situation here.
Defendants have never claimed that they were entitled to attorney's fees for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.

Tort was not

an issue between plaintiffs and defendants and consequential
damages flowing from a contract breach was neither pled nor tried
to the jury.

Defendants' sole claim for entitlement to attorney's

lOplaintiffs had been involved in suits with the subcontractors but were the "successful party" in all such matters
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fees is based upon §14-2-3.

Th e cases c1· ted, therefore ar
, e ,

inapposite to the facts of this case.
Defendants place particular reliance on the case of
Armstrong Construction Co. v. Thompson, 390 P.2d 976, 64 Wash.
2d 191 (1964).

In that case, however, the court denied

~e

sought-after award of attorney's fees, finding no statutory or
contractual basis upon which such an award could be made. Fill·
ther, those cases cited by defendants dealing with torts or co:1
require good faith, a reasonable probability of success and a
determination that the fees incurred could not have been avok
There was neither pleading nor proof on any of these issues.
In the instant case it must also be remembered that a signifk
portion of the attorney's fees incurred by defendants resulted
their assisting the subcontractors rather than defending again'
their claims.

See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 58-59.

Mr. Nebeker.

counsel for surety, on at least two occasions in fact signed
papers in this matter on behalf of the Bergs (R. B38-39, 651-1
and openly boasted on another occasion that the surety, the
contractor and subcontractors had banded together against the
owners

(Supp. T.

this point.

15) •

Defendants' Brief is also revealing on

Defendants contend that Mr. Knowlton, counsel for

the drywallers, called and examined witnesses, on behalf of
the contractor and surety, to rebut testimony of the owners'
·
the qual1' ty of the drywall
experts concern1ng
Brief, pp. 77-78) • 11

(Defendants'

Plaintiffs submit this is highlY unusuai

.
.
· d no objer.
llDefendants' contention that pla1nt1ffs ra1se
th'S '!
is in error.
In actual fact' t~e ~rial court exc~~~f-227~).
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conduct for truly "adverse" parties, since the point of the
owners' testimony was simply that the contractor, not the drywallers, owed the owners a set-off for defective work.
Defendants readily confessed liability

to

the subcon-

tractors (T. 262) but, nevertheless, required them to participate
in the lawsuit.

Further, at trial defendants took the position

that the subcontractors were entitled

to

compensation and aided

them in their claim (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 58-60),12

This is

precisely opposite to the type of conduct that might justify an
award of attorney's fees.

Rather than mitigating their damages,

defendants collaborated in compounding them and now seek to pass
them on to plaintiffs.
Having issued a Labor and Material Payment Bond on the
project, it was surety's duty to pay all legitimate claims.

It

could then seek from the owners such sums as it claimed were
due it.

Certainly the surety cannot claim it had insufficient

funds to pay the subcontractor's claims.

The contractor may

have made such a claim, but that would in no way relieve the
surety of its obligation under the Labor and Material Bond.
The full consolidated trial was the result of a deliberate
choice made by surety not to mitigate.

This Court should not

reward that conduct by requiring plaintiffs

to

pay attorney's

l2This Court will recall the numerous times the patties
••ere before it arguing the propriety of the cross appeal. and of
continuing the consolidation on appeal. Now defendants ~form
us that all of the time spent was wasted, the. su~contr~ctors
have been paid (Defendants' Brief, p. 2). Th~s ~s trp~cal of
defendants' conduct throughout this case. No real.d7spu~e
existed, the subcontractors were retained in the l~t~gat~on
merely
forby the
tactical
the defendants.
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fees for the cost of this combination.

D.

Defendants' other attempts to support the
_
award of attorney's fees must be rejected.

errone~

Defendants go far beyond the bounds of reasone d legal
precedent when they rely upon a federal civil rights
_
ing attorney's fees where perjury was found and then

~award·

deciding
between themselves that since, in their opinion, the testimony
of Lignell was "tantamount to perjury" they should, therefore,
be entitled to attorney's fees.

Mr. Lignell' s testimony was

accurate in all respects and is being unfairly distorted by de·
fendants.

See pp.

43-45 of this Reply Brief.

Equally wide of the target is defendants' claim for
attorney's fees under Rule 75 (c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule provides for an award of attorney's fees for the unnecessary substitution of evidence in a question and answer forr
for a fair narrative statement proposed by another.

In ~e

instant case, as required by this Court, plaintiffs provided
an abstract.l3

Defendants apparently are the ones that want a

substitution of evidence in question and answer form, presumabli
feeling that justice is better served by having each member of
the Court seek to extract the pertinent testimony from the
voluminous transcript and the enormous number of exhibits. Thu:
13Defendants contend no order was made by this Court
respecting the filing of an abstract (Defendants' Bri7f, P•
56). Actually, on June 27,1977, the Court, through ~tsa·
clerk, Geoffrey Butler, ordered, "Inasmuch as the record P
pears to be extensive and voluminous, the Co~rt or~ers t~~~ance
transcripts of evidence be abstracted and pr~nted ~n ace
with Rule 75(e), U.R.C.P., as amended 2-15-75."
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defendants have the facts just reversed; under Rule 75(e),
it is the plaintiffs and not the defendants that would be entitled to attorney's fees.
Point III.
DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY OF ELECTRICAL EXTRAS IS ERRONEOUS
AND CANNOT SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS.
Defendants do not deny that Clifford Berg had no knowledge concerning the components of the charge for electrical
extras made by him against the plaintiffs.
See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 19-26.

He so testified.

Defendants' response to

their failure to provide an adequate foundation for this portion
of their Exhibit 210 is to divert the Court's attention from
this critical fact by concocting an exhibit which purports to
come reasonably close to the amount of money claimed by Berg,
although no such exhibit existed at trial nor was put into evidence (Defendants' Brief, pp. 17-21).

This, however, does not

cure Mr. Berg's lack of knowledge at trial and his failure to
meet the evidentiary requirements of Rule 19, U.R.E.l 4

Further,

the concocted summary simply does not support the jury verdict.
A.

Defendants have manufactured an inaccurate exhibit

in an attempt to justify the mistaken award of damages.
14Defendants' citations to the record relating to the
electrical portion of Exhibit 210 do not help. They cite to
T. 2515 and 2517 but fail to cite to T. 2516 where Berg, o~
n
examination by his own counsel, stated that the "$40,000 f~gure
had not been discussed or billed to Lignell. Further, he testified, Q. "Have you ever had the opportunity to compute that
figure out?" A.
"No, I haven't."
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This Court should not be impressed that

a year after the

trial counsel for defendants can, in the quiet solitude
offices, derive a set of figures that come close to the

of thet

amount

awarded; rather, this Court's inquiry should be directed to the
question of whether at the time of trial adequate foundation
was presented, in this case by Mr. Berg, to allow his testi!lllny
and Exhibit 210 relating to electrical extras to be admitted.
Plaintiffs submit that there was not (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp,

26-29).
Defendants freely acknowledge that there were many dupli:
change orders (Defendants' Brief, pp. 13-14) and have apparently gone to great lengths in an attempt to eliminate these
duplicate charges from their summary.

They cannot say, however

that the jury was able to make that same exclusion.

Plaintiffs

submit that the defendants have merely determined the figures
that they wanted and then backed into them with selected work
kets.

The summary of exhibits prepared by

t

defendants is in·

accurate and misleading.
1.

Defendants' summary contains many duplications.

In spite of defendants' efforts, their summary contains
many duplicate and erroneous charges.

Although the testimony'

uncontroverted that the price to the owners for the additional

22 apartments, including wiring, was $201,300.00 and that

we

. .
f
. . g the adde
charge to the contractor by the electr1c1an or.w1r1n

22 apartments was $19,250.00, defendants • summary c ontains not
only the $19,250.00 charge but also some eight other charges
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-36Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

that relate solely to those additional units.lS

Other dupli-

cations or improper charges include enlarging the elevator
power feed,l6 three-phase power, 17 circuit breakers,lB and
exit 1 igh ts • 19
What this all shows is that defendants, even on quiet
reflection in their offices, without the threat of cross-examination, still made numerous errors, duplicated exhibits and
lSFor instance, "Wire complete added apt., Building C";
"Add additional service to additional apt., Bu~lding B" (Defendants' Brief, p. 20, #3 and #8); "Install hood fans for added
~, 23 apts. x $20.00"; "Add telephone feed to 22 apts:-w-(Defendants' Brief, p. 21, #1 and #2); "Change main sw~tch
and meter assembly to cover the additional apt. to Buildings
A and B"; "Add on to telephone service to cover added apartment in Buildings A & B" (Defendants' Brief, p. r=r;-14 and #6);
"Install telephone feed in added apt., Building C"; "Install
panel subfeed in added ~, Building C" (Defendants' Brief,
p. 19, #6 and #7); all relate to the wiring for the additional
units. In addition, Exhibit 100, utilized by defendants in
deriving their summary (Defendants' Brief, p. 17), also contains
a charge of $865.00 to "pipe and wire apartment in Building C."
16compare Defendants' Brief, p. 18, Item #2, and p. 19,
Item #12.
17on page 17 of their Brief, defendants list a charge of
$297.00 to add three-phase power for the elevator in Building A;
on page 21, however, defendants list an additional charge of
$320.00 to install three-phase power for elevator in Building A.
Exhibit 58-2 listed in lump sum by defendants also contains a
charge for three-phase power to Building A. See also Plaintiffs'
Brief, p. 23.
lBon page 21 defendants list a charge of $3,251.95 to .
"change breaker on all A/C units" and cross reference that charge
to change order #95730 which is listed on page 18. Ticket No.
95730, however recites a charge of $25.00 per apartment, not
$53.31 as is utilized by defendants on their "exf;i~it." In
addition, the Murray Electric change orders, Exh~b~t No. 53-3,
contain a charge of $29.00/unit to change the breakers on the
air conditioning units.
19Defendants claim $425.00 for exit lights (Defendants'
Brief, p. 21, #9) although Berg agreed at trial that this charge
was in
error (T. 2939).
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doubled in charges that they are attempting to pass on to the
plaintiffs.

There is no evidence that the combinations selectE

by defendants correspond in any way to what the jury considerec.
In fact, the thought that the jury could have kept these multiple cases and confusing billings straight is beyond belief.
Defendants have included in their summary in one l~p
sum the "extra work" performed by Murray Electric under change
orders which totalled some $2,198.27 (Exhibit 58-P, Defendants'
Brief, p. 22).

Besides the duplicate charges set forth above,

the testimony was uncontroverted that the majority of these
change orders related to repair work for defective items that
had been done by Murray's predecessor on the job, Comstock Elec·
tric (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 24-25) a."ld should not legitimate!)
be charged back to the owners.
2.

Defendants' summary contains many unsubstantiate:

charges.
In attempting to arrive at a figure in the neighborhood
of $86,000.00, defendants have included a charge of $9,375.00~
"increase in the wire size from #4 to #2"
p. 22).

(Defendants' Brief,

Defendants acknowledge that Mr. Comstock convenientlY

"remembered" this charge at the time of trial.

There is, how·

ever, no testimony that Berg Was mak •;ng th;• s same charge agains:
the plaintiffs or who caused the charge, the electrician, con·
tractor or owner.

Further, Comstock testified that he did!D

know whether or not that wor k Was actually
_ done for Buildings
Indeed, there is no testimony that the
1· nclude
work was ever per f ormed • The defend ants, nevertheless'

A and B (T.

935-16).
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that charge in their surnrnary.20
Perhaps the most curious figure in the entire summary
is the charge for "material left on the job" in the amount of
$14,788.32 (Defendants' Brief, pp. 24-25).

The record is totally

devoid of any claim by Berg for any electrical inventory left on
the premises!

The electrician brought a conversion action against

the owners in the consolidated case, seeking compensation for
materials it claimed were left on the job.
rejected by the jury and judgment of no
behalf of the owners (R. Cl024).

That claim was

~

was rendered on

There was no claim made by the

electrician against the contractor for any materials and no
claim was ever made by Berg against the owners for any electrical inventory items.

Further, Mr. Berg testified that the

owners had paid for materials before they were installed on the
project (T. 697).

Mr. Weaver, the electrician's employee on the

job, testified that when he left the project most of the materials
claimed by the electrician had, in fact, been installed (T.
935-93 to 935-94).

In addition, Defendants' Exhibit 210 con-

tains not one whisper about "material left on the job".

This is

yet another example of defendants' grasping at any convenient
figure to plug into their total in order to come close to the
amount the jury awarded.

Absent this spurious charge, defendants'

"summary" comes up woefully short.

Defendants' "summary" also

fails to give the owners credit for i terns adrni ttedly not done •

20Mrs. comstock's inventory placed a maximum price o~
#2 wire of 26¢ (Ex. 83-P). If the 30¢ price differ7nce cla1rned
b~ defendants really existed this would make the pr1ce of #4
Wlre Sponsored
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These come to a minimum of $5,250.00 (Plaintiffs' Brief , p p. 2~,.
28-29).

Additionally, many of the charges relating to the extr

22 units contained in the "summary," would h ave to be reduced
proportionately since much of that work was admittedly not COm·
pleted.

See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 21-22.

At a minimum,

~e

amount awarded is simply wrong, requiring re-trial.
B.

Defendants cannot distinguish between those "extras"

that were included in the contractor's contract and those that
were not.
fatal~

Defendants' electrical summary contains the same
as did all of its exhibits relating to damages:

(1)

I t fails

to differentiate between those charges which are extras to the
contractor but not extras to the owner, and ( 2)

It assumes tha'.

the price charged by the subcontractors to the con tractor is tb1
same price that was charged by the contractor to the owners.
Berg agreed to construct the apartments and the addition;
units for a fixed price.

The additional apartments were

constructed for $201,300.00.

w~

Whether this price from the con-

tractor to the owners included an allowance for wiring of $1U
$1,000.00 or $10,000.00 was immaterial to the owners.

If the

price the contractor had to pay for the electrical work was

Jtl)ri

or less than was figured in the bid, the contractor would eithe:
· ff
21
profit or lose by th e d ~ erence.
was allowed to pass on to th e owners

At the tr;al, however, ser
•
all Of the Cla imed electri·

. .
h
ount all~
21Berg so test~hed (T. 1068). In fact, t e am
'th
for electrical in the bid was $117,000.00 but. the coz:.:;:~ia~~
the electrician was $107,000.00, thereby. ca':ls~n~ an.~
?)·
$10,000.00
profit
the
contractor
(Pla~nt~ffs
P·
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cal "extras" relating to the 22 units by lumping them together
l·n

h1's accounting exhibit.

Thus ,

1.' n

a dd"t·
1. l.on to the charge of

$19,2 50. 0 0 to "wire 22 added units" which may or may not have

been the amount figured by Berg in the bid, the owners were also
charged for many other items relating solely to the additional
units

(Plaintiffs' Brief, P?· 22-25) .22

Berg knew, for

example, that range hood fans were required when he prepared
the bid for the extra units

(T. 1164, 2922).

These would be an extra

from the electrician to the contractor but were included in the
fixed price bid to the owners.

Nevertheless, this charge was

passed through to the owners by Berg

(Defendants' Brief,

p. 21, #1); therefore, the owners have been charged twice for
this item, once when the price of the units was established and
again when the "extra" was passed through to them.

Since there

was no attempt to show which "extras" did not relate to the 22
units, many of the contractor's "extras" may in fact be the
result of an underbid by it
added units.

of the basic structure or the

If one assumes, for example, that the contractor

figured everything correctly for the added 22 units except for
the electrical charges which it figured as $9,250.00 (rather
than $19,250.00) even without considering the duplicate charges,
this $10,000.00 underbid would, under the accounting permitted
in this case, be passed on to the owners as an "extra" making
their price for the additional units not the agreed $201,300 • 00
22 This would hold true for other extras relating to the
apartment and the 22 units, such as lumber, carpentry, glass,
Plumbing, etc.
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but $211,300.00.

If the contractor mad

calculations they would likewise be

e any o

th

er errors in i:

passed on to the owners,

further inflating the price of the added units.23
defendants loudly protest against co t
s

Although
1
P us contracts, this is

precisely what has been inflicted on the hapless owners in the
instant case.

Defendants were totally unable to state, partie;·

larly with relation to the electr;cal,
wh · h "
~c
extras" were due
•
to changes in the plans and specifications, if any, and which
were the result of an underbid on the part of the general con·
tractor. 24
It should further be pointed out that Berg testified tha
the sum of $18,000.00

(as contained in Defendants' Exhibit 210;

was to cover all electrical extras to that date (T. 2939).

Ne1·

ther that exhibit nor the one contained in their brief differ·
entiates between those "extras" that were included in the $18,!1
and those that were not.
At a minimum, the question of what, if anything, is due
from the owners to the contractor should be re-tried even if
23This same rationale is applicable to the basic 125 unr
structure; thus, rather than holding the contractor to a fixed
price contract, the partnership was allowed to recover on a
cost plus basis with their cost overruns being passed on to the
owners under the guise of "extras."
24After admitting that there were some 234 change order!
many of which were duplicates (Defendants' Brief, pp. 13-14),
defendants go on to acknowledge that the verdict of Murr~Y
Electric against the Bergs was "based upon all of the wntt~
chanc;7e orders" (Defendants' Brief, p. 40). Defendants make no
dist~nction between duplicate change orders, change orders to
the contractor that were not changes to the owners or change
orders in excess of the amount of the contractor's bid, thus
giving further evidence that the amount awarded defendants
against owners is highly inflated.
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the "lack of license" and "wrong counterclaimant" issues are
decided against appellants.
Point IV.
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF PERJURY IS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED.
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the perverse and inflammatory reasoning of defendants which permeates their entire
brief than their claim that Lignell' s testimony was "tantamount
to perjury."

That charge is totally unsupported by the record,

however, plaintiffs cannot let such a charge pass unchallenged.
One subcontractor did present a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation by Lignell to the jury.

On the basis of Lignell's testi-

mony the charge of fraud, as well as all the other issues between
the subcontractors and the owners, were determined in the
owners' favor--clearly establishing that his testimony was
considered worthy of belief.
Defendants concluded between themselves that perjury was
committed by quoting portions of the transcript out of context
relating to plaintiffs' claim to a set-off.

Lignell testified

that there had been a meeting with Clifford Berg wherein certain items which were deleted from the plans or simply omitted
by the contractor had been traded for some of the so-called "extras."
At the time of the trial, however, Berg refused to honor that
agreement and listed the items the owners thought had been
settled and traded among the items for which the counterclaimant
was still seeking compensation.

Lignell's point was that if

the trade-off were to be disavowed, both sides should be restored
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to their claims.

Berg should not be permitted to disavow his

credits to the owners while still keeping the credits the owne:
had given him in exchange.

Lignell testified that there had in

fact been a meeting and a set-off regarding some of the

ite~

defendants were then proposing as compensable extras (T. 330?·
3312).

On cross-examination Attorney Beesley's question was

whether the trade-off occurred in 197 2, to which Lignell said
"no."

Beesley then asked if it was Lignell' s position that the

trade-off occurred in 1974, to which Lignell said "yes" (T.
3347).

Lignell responded negatively to Beesley's inquiry as tc

whether "these two items were traded off for each other in add!·
tion to putting cedar on one of the bedroom walls," but did agr:
that the trade-off did include, but was not limited to, those
items

(T.

3347).

Lignell stated that ItDSt, but not all, ofthe

items "traded" were discussed (T.

3348) •

Ml:.

Beesley kept

contending, however, that if any trade-off occurred it occurrec
in 1972.
"Isn 1 t

Mr. Beesley's last question on the subject was:

it a fact, Doctor, that in the meeting of January of

1974, no agreement was reached; as a matter of fact, you both
went out of the place rather stewed you say, you and also Mr.
Berg?"
(T.

Lignell replied, "No, sir, I don't agree with that."

3350).

Later, on re-direct, Lignell reaffirmed that in

fact certain set-offs had been made

(T. 3363) •

ion in oefen·
Rather than denying a set-a ff as the Vers •
.
. d that ther
dants' Brief implies, Lignell consistently ma~nta~ne
had been a set-off.

Defendants 1 counsel, on the other hand,
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contended that there had not (T. 3350).

Defendants • tortured

interpretation of the record can hardly be characterized as
"devastating" and certainly cannot be used as a spz:ingboard to
justify punishment by way of sustaining an erroneous award of
attorney's fees.
Point

v.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO RESPOND TO MANY OF PLAINTIFFS'
POINTS AND CONTAINS MANY INACCURATE STATEMENTS.
Defendants' Brief is essentially an emotional appeal to
the Court to punish the plaintiffs because a confused jury
brought in an unsupportable verdict.

Emotionalism is not,

however, a substitute for legal analysis.

Defendants' Brief

is equally notable for what it does not say and what it does not
challenge.
cannot

Because of the length of this Reply Brief, plaintiffs

catalogue all of the contentions put forth in Plaintiffs'

Brief to which defendants have not responded.
Defendants apparently do not contest the claims made in
Appellants' Brief that the plaintiffs were deprived of a fair
trial by virtue of the consolidation of the several cases
(Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 85-96), that the contract standards
respecting the owners and the contractor were different from
those between the contractor and his subcontractors {Plaintiffs'
Brief, pp. 14-15, 17), a distinction not reflected in the verdict or the judgment, and that, as between the owners and the
contractor, much of the work either was not done by the contractor
or was below the standard reqUired by the construction contract-yet no adjustment was made in the award to reflect those items
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Defendants' Brief is also replete with innuendos and
wholly inaccurate statements.

Plaintiffs cannot in the space

allotted deal with all of these but briefly call the Court's
attention to the following:
l.

Defendants state that the ow ners were rentl.ng
·
apart·

ments "long before the extended date of completion.
Brief, p. 11).

11

(Defend~

Berg testified, however, that the agreement be·

tween the parties was to finish the buildings in sequence so
that they could be rented as soon as completed (T. l172-ll7J,
690) •
2.

Defendants erroneously state that there was no disp'.

that the work was done

(Defendants' Brief, p. 6).

there was, and is, a great dispute.

Actually,

Taylor Biesinger of ACT

Construction testified that he, not Berg, did the curb, gutter
and sidewalk

(T. 2081-2082), Berg did not install a $3,300.00

retaining wall

(T. 208 8) , or the rredicine cabinets (T. 1177).

Much of the electrical work was not done and had to be finishec
by Mr.
22) •

Bateman (T. 1753-1755; see also Plaintiffs' Brief, P·
Many of Lignell' s notations on Exhibit 100 relating to

electrical "extras" state "not authorized, not done 11 •

The

circuit breaker size was not changed as defendants' claim (T.
936-114) •

The three-phase wiring billed as an extra was done (

Mr. Bateman not

by Murray Electric (T. 1833) •

Berg himself

stated that when Murray left the project there was a lot of
electrical work left to do (T. 680).

3.

Defendants argue that the plans did not s how wet ana

dry by
standpipes
or Funding
a stairway
to the
roof
(Defendants'
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Brief,

p. 27) but neglect to point out that these and other items were
added to the plans by the city building department by October
20, 1971 (T. 976-980), and that Berg was aware of the additions
~

the contract was signed (T. 1009).
4.

Defendants state that it is "obvious" that Berg's

documents were just "worksheets" (Defendants' Brief, p. 29).
If so, where' s the bid?

It is interesting to note that the

account book (Ex. 255) given by Cliff to his brother, Frank,
follows almost exactly Exhibit 127, the document identified by
Lignell as being the bid that he received (T. 1239), and that
Berg admitted that the figures on Exhibit 127 are what he quoted
to Lignell (T. 1063-1067).
5.

Defendants state that ACT Construction performed

work which was not on the plans ·(Defendants' Brief, p. 34).
is true.
costs

~ere

This

Defendants neglected to mention, however, that these
billed separately by ACT to the owners and were not

included in the $14,266.91 payment charged to the contractor
(T.

2080).
6.

Defendants state that Barry Ingham prepared a sec-

ond contract in the name of "Clifford M. Berg and William R.
Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg Construction
Company" (Defendants' Brief, p. 43).

Defendants omitted,

however, the reference in the contract to Frank Berg.

Actually,

the contract prepared by Ingham listed the contractor as "Clifford

M. Berg and William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers
Construction and Frank

c.

Berg, an individual, a joint venture,

d/b/a
Berg
Company."
9-D)
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7.

Defendants state that there was no attempt by ~e

owners to prove that Cliff Berg had authority to sign f

or Fran,
Berg and that "no documents were executed by the joint venture
agreement"

(sic)

(Defendants' Brief, p. 44) •

Defendants ha•;.

overlooked the affidavit of Cliff Berg (Ex. 164-D) setting for
his authority to execute documents on behalf of the joint vent.

the Subordination of Lien Request (Ex. 165-D) signed by all
participants of the joint venture (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 4H
and the bond application in the name of the joint venture sigr.i
by Frank Berg (Ex. 255).
8.

Copies are found in Plaintiffs' Brie:

Defendants imply that Berg did not know about ~e

requirement of a bond until after the contract was signed (De·
fendants' Brief, p. 43) •

Actually Berg submitted an applica·

tion for a bond on the project in June, 1971, some 4 1/2 roonth:
before the contract was signed (Ex. 256).
9.

Defendants state that Lignell verbally requested

all extra electrical work to be done

(Defendants' Brief, p. 41!

This statement, however, is belied by another section of their
Brief which states that the extra electrical work "had, in fact
been requested by Berg" (Defendants' Brief, p. 16).
10.

Defendants make several references to the fraud clat

brought against Lignell

(Defendants' Brief, pp. 10, 53), appar·

ently in a deliberate attempt to influence this Court to con·
elude that Lignell is "guilty" because that claim was filed
against him.

Defendants neglect to point out that the jurY re·

turned a verdict of no cause on the fraud claim thus exoner·
ating
from
claim.
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ll.

Defendants argue there was "no rreeting of the minds"

relating to the extras included in the contract addendum (Defendants'
Brief, p. 29).

In actual fact, l1r. Berg testified that he dis-

cussed the extras extensively with Lignell (T. 1194-1195).
12.

Defendants imply that Exhibit 255 was read to the

jury without objection (Defendants' Brief, p. 76).

Objection

was clearly made to reading extracts to the jury (T. 3179).
That exhibit, however, only related to Frank Berg and not to the
other members of the joint venture.

Objection was made to the

introduction of Exhibit 256--the bond indemnity agreement signed
by

Cliff and Bill.

That document was admitted over the objec-

tion of plaintiffs (T. 3189).

Since there was no dispute between

surety and the Bergs the sole purpose for these exhibits was
sympathy
13.

(Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 90) •
Defendants state that Berg never considered the

joint venture (Defendants' Brief, p. 44), but fail to point out
that Berg testified that not only did he consider it, he discussed it with his brothers and they all agreed to it (T. 1081) •
14.

Defendants imply that there were no objections lodged

against their accounting exhibits (Defendants' Brief, P· 76).
Plaintiffs vigorously objected to Ex. 210 because of the reasons
set forth in this appeal (T. 2628, 2307).

Exhibit 252, being a

summary of 210, contained the same fatal defects as did Ex. 210.
The Court, however, had previously decided to admit Ex. 210.
There are many additional inaccuracies in Defendants'
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Brief. 25
25 For instance:
1. Defendants contend Lignell instructed the dr
to prepare a contract (Defendants' Brief, p. 10). Actu~~~llers
con trac;:t was prepared by Mr. Knowlton, the drywallers, at~ the
at the~r request (T. 278-279).
orne.
2. Defendants contend that the completion date was ex·
tended to September 30, 1973 (Defendants' Brief, p. 12). The
lette~ of Ea~l Tanner was actually a notice to the contract
that ~ t was ~n default (Ex. 87-D) •
or
... 3. Defendants claim attorney's fees were awarded to
them ~n accor~ax:ce with the well-known legal doctrine of reasc:
able foreseeab~l~ty" (Defendants' Brief, p. 54). This is a ne•
thought neither pled nor proven; defendants' award was based
solely on §14-2-3 and must rise or fall on that statute see
pp. 30-32 of this Brief.
•
4. Defendants state that Berg's license was "reinstated'
(Defendants' Brief, pp. 60-61). Actually, after revocation
Berg rec7i ved a ~ license. It had a different number, a dif·
ferent b~d amount and was of a different classification ~an
was his previous license (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 68).
5. Defendants claim Lignell took control of the rroney
from Berg (Defendants' Brief, pp. 8, 9, 75) but fail to state
that Berg agreed that payments be made in this fashion (T. 1m
1181, 1206, 1250-1251), and that the checks were physically
delivered to Berg who in turn disbursed them to the subcontract·
ors (T. 685-687). Further, payments were to be made pursuant
to draw requests from Berg, and funds were disbursed promptly
by the owners after the necessary draw request was received
(T. 3158-3172).
6. Defendants apparently claim that the lack of appli·
ances delayed the completion of the electrical work (Defendant;'
Brief, p. 23). Actually a careful reading of the testimony
reveals that although Mrs. Comstock claimed some appliances wer:
missing she did not state that was a reason for the delay in
the electrical completion. She further acknowledged that two
apartments were so full of appliances that they oouldn't get
in (T. 631). Mr. Weaver stated emphatically that there was no
delay caused by lack of appliances (T. 1757).
7. Defendants repeatedly complain that the owners did
not have books of account on the project. This is untrue!
Lignell testified that they had records reflecting the change
orders. These, he stated were composed of several different o·
documents (T. 1464). But more important, defendants never pr
duced any books kept by the contractor on the project. Berg
testified he didn't have any records of his own (T. 1194) · rae·
Apparently, defendants have concluded that the general cent
tor was under no duty to maintain his own records.
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Defendants ask how the owners could make out-of-pocket
expenditures and charge them to the contractor (Defendants'
Brief, p. 35).

For this authority plaintiffs cite Rex T.

Fuhriman v. Jarrell, 21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1968).
Defendants have, based solely upon their own suppositions, also liberally sprinkled inflammatory adjectives throughout
their Brief.

Defendants boldly declare that certain "facts"

are "obvious" or "inescapable."

There is no question, claim the

defendants, that certain hypothecated actions were "deliberate."
Further, defendants presume to know and state without equivocation what the jury "realized," what convinced it and why it
decided as it did.

Such flamboyance, unsupported by the record,

should not be persuasive in this cause.
CONCLUSION
In an obvious effort to cover up their own acts of appropriation of materials charged to the owners (T. 2834-2841, 28472848, 2856, 2859, 2860-2862), collusion (Supp. T. 15), neglect
and incompetence (T. 1268-1270, 1870-1871, 2184-2185), failure
to keep records (T. 1194), job abandonment (T. 1285-1289) and
lack of license, the defendants both at trial and in their Brief
have launched a tirade of charges and innuendos accusing the
owners, particularly E. Keith Lignell, of the very things of
which they, themselves, were guilty.

Plaintiffs submit that

these actions, in addition to their "banding together" with the
subcontractors, were for the express purpose of distorting the
facts and thereby confusing the jury to such an extent that the
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normal judicial process was frustrated.
perpetuate that confusion in this Court.

Defendants hope to
The separate claims

of the subcontractors and defendants against the owners were
so weak on an individual basis that their only hope for succes:
was to consolidate the suits, insist on a jury trial and then
assist one another in order to impress upon the jury that the
preponderance of evidence was always on their side (four to one
It seems incomprehensible that although the partnershi;
was being sued by Western (Bailey) and the joint venture was
being sued by Comstock Mr. Berg made no attempt to defend eithe
himself or the various entities against such claims, but in fac

agreed to any and all of the subcontractors' charges and even.,
so far as to assist the subcontractors in obtaining judgments
against him, the partnership and the joint venture.

This creal

an intolerable situation for plaintiffs since they not only hac
to defend against the charges brought against them but also hao
to attempt to bring out the truth about the "facts" which were
being badly distorted in the sham trial between the Bergs aM
the subcontractors of which plaintiffs were not a part.

The

trial court erroneously allowed these distorted "facts" to spil.
over into, and taint, the suit between plaintiffs and defendant
, a·

This court has an opportunity to correct the rniscarna,:
of justice that has occurred by reversing the trial decision.
Since the surety derived the trial strategy and it and the Bell'
.
been·
took the gamble of not defending themselves aga~nst the su
· plea in hindsight tha:
tractors in the consolidated trial, th e~r
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they would have approached the matter differently had they known
the Bergs were unlicensed reflects the same sort of cynicism that
gave rise to their strategy of "confuse and conquer" in the first
place and deserves no consideration by a court of justice.
The confusing consolidation, along with the fact that
the partnership, as an unlicensed contractor, has recovered a
judgment when it wasn't even the contracting party, are the more
obvious of an unbelievable series of errors that were committed
throughout the entire trial.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court should
reverse the judgment on the counterclaims and deny the award of
attorney's fees.

At an absolute minimum, the cause between the

parties to this appeal should be remanded for a new trial, free
of the distracting clutter of the subcontractors' claims.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Lignell and Todd
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